Blog 8- Political Violence- Alex Miller
In
the case of political violence, Indonesia is yet another country so often rocked
with minor conflicts because of its poverty and ethnic as well as religious
tensions. Over the past thirty years, Indonesia provides a strong case for
instances of civil war within its borders, especially in the region of the Aceh
province on the northern tip of Sumatera from 1976-2002.
As defined in David D. Samuels’ Comparative Politics, civil war is
defined as, “Armed combat within the boundaries of a sovereign state between
parties that are subject to common authority at the start of the hostilities”
(Samuels 259).
The conflict in the Aceh province of
Indonesia exemplifies Samuels’ definition because the conflict was certainly
armed combat, causing upwards of 14,464 deaths in rebel and military clashes[1]
and because the insurgents were under the same authority as the government at
the beginning of the war.
The conflict began by the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or the Free
Aceh Movment, was an effort on the part of a separatist group of Islamists
desired to form their own country with an established Islamic government guided
by Sharia or Islamic Law, free from the more liberal, western laws established
after Indonesia’s independence from the Dutch in August of 1945. The GAM took
up arms against the Indonesian government from 1953-1959 in the Darul Rebellion
and 1976 to 2005 in what was known as the Aceh Insurgency, which consisted
primarily of guerilla raids of weapons caches, attacks on police and military
posts, and assassinations of police, government, and military officials
(Aspinal 110).
The catalyst for this civil war were
a factor of the parties being subject to the same authority at the beginning of
their hostilities; the authority of the Republic of Indonesia. The
opportunistic reasons stem from a colonial legacy, and international context of
support from Libya, and the geography while the interests were primarily
religious grievances.
The opportunistic reasons, which
support Samuels’ definition, were first; a Dutch colonial legacy which placed
Aceh into the hands of the Indonesian government after Indonesia’s independence
without having consulted the people of Aceh, depriving them of funds from Aceh
natural resources, second; international context because they received
financial support from Libya’s leader Muammar al-Qadaffi in fighting
Imperialism, Racism, Zionism, and Fascism[2],
and third; geography because the rebels were able to hide in the mountains and
forests of Aceh.
The Interest reasons, which support
Samuels’ definition in Comparative Politics,
were primarily cultural grievances because of a felt restriction on their
religious practices, but a slight factor of not greed, not because of wanted
illegal practices, but because they felt slighted over the lack of funding
coming from their natural resources.
Lastly, this agrees with Samuels’
definition of civil war, and differs from revolution, because in the end, the
Acehnese didn’t succeed in causing a dramatic, wholesale political shift to
their Islamic government under a new authority. Instead they were content to
agree to a peace treaty over a “special province” designation, which allowed
them to practice their Sharia law in their province, under the direction of the
Republic of Indonesia’s laws.
Therefore for the above reasons, the
civil war in Aceh perfectly fits the description of Samuels’s definition of
““Armed combat within the boundaries of a sovereign state between parties that
are subject to common authority at the start of the hostilities” (Samuels 259).
Aspinall, Edward. Islam and Nation:
Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2009.
Print.
Collier, Paul. Understanding Civil
War: Evidence and Analysis. Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005. Print.
Samuels, David. Comparative
Politics. New York: Pearson Education, 2013. Print.
good paper, I liked how you examined all parts in the cause of this civil war and how you kept bringing it back to Samuel's book definition.
ReplyDelete