Thursday, November 1, 2012

Blog 7: Duverger's Law


Ashlan Neuenschwander
PL SC 150
Professor Hawkins
10/31/12

Blog 7

            Duverger’s law asserts that the electoral rules of a country directly influence the effective number of parties. For example, states with single-member-district plurality (SMDP) systems tend to produce two effective parties while proportional representation (PR) rules tend are inclined to have multi-party legislature. To test this, Israel’s electoral system is an interesting example of this theory. The proportional representation of Israel’s electoral system allows for multi-party legislature and is positively correlated with Duverger’s assertions as indicated by its electoral rules and effective number of parties.
            In Israel, the electoral rules are rather simple and straightforward. Israel has a proportional representation system in which candidates are directly elected based on nonpreferential party lists. Under a proportional representation system, representation in legislature by political parties’ is directly proportional to its strength in the electorate (Shively 231). Furthermore, the seats are proportioned by the simple quotient and highest average system, d’Hondt’s formula (IPU). Also, there is a 2% threshold. This means that in order for a party to be granted a seat in legislature it must receive at least 2% of the popular vote. In Israel, the district magnitude is equal to the number of members in legislature, 120 in this instance (IPU). In the election booths, voters are asked to vote for a party rather than a candidate, a nonpreferential list structure. After the votes are determined, a number of candidates, from each party above the 2% threshold, are appointed seats according to how well their party did in the electorate. Those at the top of the list receive seats before those below them. The electoral rules in this system are quite standard and are not a hybrid.
Understanding the electoral system of Israel is not enough to qualify Duverger’s law, the number of effective parties must be determined to see if there is a correlation. In the most recent election in 2009, using the formula: number of effective parties = 1/∑(p2), p being proportion of seats won by a single party, there are 6.8, or 6, effective parties (Wikipedia). As Duverger’s law predicted, there are multiple effective parties in legislature with a PR electoral system. The quality of party competition is also important when determining the validity of the number of effective parties (Hawkins). Israel’s legislature is a multi-party plurality with high contestation: multiple parties gained representation in parliament fairly. With this, Duverger’s law has held true.
It is interesting to note, however, that Israel’s form of legislature is very ineffective. Because of the 2% threshold, many parties can enter into the Knesset (Israel’s parliament). This creates diversity that ultimately leads to legislation extremely difficult to pass and “As a result, thirty-four parties contested the most recent election and twelve won seats” (Hertzburg). Imagine how many political parties enter into the Knesset that cannot effectively rule government.
Duverger’s law claims that a country like Israel with a PR system will have multiple parties in its legislature. The electoral rules of Israel, in a PR system, operate under d’Hondt’s formula with a 2% threshold, a high district magnitude, a nonpreferential, or closed list structure, and a “top-down” candidate seat appointment. After exploring the extent of Israel’s election rules and comparing it to its number of effective parties, Duverger’s law correctly asserted this correlation.





Work Cited

Hawkins, Kirk. "Political Parties." Comparative Government and Politics. UT, Provo. 29 2012. Lecture.
Hendrik, Hertzburg. "Israel’s Election System is No Good." The New Yorker. N.p., 02 2009. Web. 31 Oct 2012. <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/hendrikhertzberg/2009/04/israels-electio.html>.
IPU, . "Israel Knesset (Parliament)." Inter-Parliamentary Union. N.p., 10 2009. Web. 31 Oct 2012. <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2155_E.htm>.
Shively, W. Phillips. Power and Choice An Introduction to Political Science. 13. p. cm. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012. 231. Web.
Wikipedia, . "Israel Legislative Election, 2009." Wikipedia. N.p., 26 2012. Web. 31 Oct 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_legislative_election,_2009>.






1 comment:

  1. I really liked how you tied everything together in the end. You described the electoral rules in a very clear way. I also liked how you included the consequence of having such a low threshold and how it only made their form of legislation ineffective by having so many parties. Great job!

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