Duverger’s Law: A Twist
In
the 1950’s and 60’s, Maurice Duverger began publishing his findings concerning
the link between the party system and the electoral system. Titled as a “Law”
by the vast majority of political scientists, Duverger found that the single-member
district plurality (SMDP) rules produce two effective parties, while
proportional representation rules allow for more political parties. In this
blog I will put this theory to the test by computing the number of effective
parties for a certain country, and describing that country’s electoral rules.
The country that I have chosen is France.
We will begin by computing the number of effective
parties in France. According to Duverger’s Law, if France is a SMDP, the number
will average out to two, however; if the country follows a proportional
representation system, the end result will average to three or higher. The
formula “Neff = 1 / Σ(proportions)2”
is applied to the following table in order to find the results[1].
Party
|
# of Seats
|
Proportions
|
Socialist Party
|
258
|
.45
|
Union for a
Popular Movement
|
185
|
.32
|
Other left wing
parties
|
21
|
.04
|
Europe-Ecology-The
Greens
|
16
|
.03
|
Other parties of the
right
|
14
|
.02
|
New Centre
|
11
|
.02
|
Left Radical
|
11
|
.02
|
Left Front
|
10
|
.02
|
Radical Party
|
6
|
.01
|
Any other parties were
excluded from the forum because the size made them somewhat irrelevant. The
applied formula looks like the flowing:
(.45
+ .32 + .04 + .03 + 4(.02) + .01)2 → .2 + .1 + .0016 + .0009 +
4(.0004) + .0001 = .3042
1/.3042
= Neff = 3.28
Therefore, according to
the formula alone, France has a proportional representation system. Before that
result is set in stone, it should be double checked against the electoral rules
of the country.
France uses the “runoff election” system, a system which
allows for two separate elections to ensure that there can be a majority rule
even with multiple parties. They do not use a threshold to allow for a third of
fourth election, but rather the two most popular candidates are presented on
the ballot during the second election. The candidates come from the French
legislature, which is comprised of 277 seats, representing 277 districts both
in France, and abroad. Thus the district magnitude (or amount of seat allotted
to each district) is 1[2]. All
of this information supports that France follows the single-member district
plurality system.
Now, how does all of this information go together? One
might be tempted to call this a hybrid, as it contains elements of both the
SMDP and proportional representation (from the formula). When looking more
closely we see that although there are three main effective parties, only two contest each other in the final election. In the end this drives France to be a SMDP country.
Although it is not the perfect example of Duverger’s Law, it does conform well
enough to support his theories.
It is cool to see that even in a hybrid system, Duverger's law still exists to the extent concluded in the example of France.
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