Since 1978[1],
Spain has been slowly democratizing it’s government into what we know
today. Throughout this time it’s government
has slowly evolved into a constitutional monarchy, with a clear constitution
outlining the powers, a prime minister, and a monarch.
A major facet of Spain’s relatively recent democratic government is
it’s electoral system, and I will focus on it’s compliance, or violation of
Duverger’s Law. Duverger’s law states that “the effective number of parties in
any electoral district is a function of the electoral rules.[2]”
In other words Duverger believed that “proportional representation tends to
lead to the formation of many independent parties…the plurality rule tends to
produce a two-party system.”[3]
Spain’s electoral system does not fall in line with Duverger’s law, to identify
why this is, we must first analyze it’s electoral system, and observe the lack
of correlation between proportional representation and independent parties.
In the Spanish bicameral lower
house, el Congreso de los Diputados, the three hundred and fifty seats are
allocated proportionally, and is not a hybrid of any seperate systems. Each province
receives two seats with the autonomus cities of Ceuta and Melilla both
receiving one[4],
then all remaining seats are allocated proportionally according to population.
As such, the district magnitude varies from two to seven seats per province;
this system of proportional representation may sound beneficial; however, it
does have some major drawbacks. One draw back of this system is the propensity
for overrepresentation in small provinces, and low representation in large
provinces, this issue results in an increase in the traditional three percent political
threshold. This three percent threshold is based on the D’Hondt method, a seat
allocation method which slightly favors large parties, and also dictates
Spain’s list structure. The D’Hondte method is used to “elect candidates from
political parties in approximate proportion to the proportion of votes won by
that party.”[5]
List structure is an important part of an electoral system because it
determines whether citizens will be able to independently choose their favorite
leader, or if their candidate will be imposed on them. As Spain functions under
a closed, or non preferential structure, they seek to “prevent the
personalization of candidates to avoid the electoral clienteles, increase party
cohesion, and stable governments, enhancing the dominance of party leaders over
their parliamentary groups”[6]
To facilitate this closed list structure, Spain’s 2.67 effective parties rate
their candidates and voters cast votes for the party itself, the generally
small contestation due to having so few effective parties significantly limits
the division among constituents, however there are numerous small faction
parties.
In Spain’s electoral law preamble it
states “Based on the proportional system, the main goal of the electoral system
is to produce an absolute majority of seats for a party with one-third of the
votes.” Through the adherence to this electoral law and the above stated
formula, threshold, list structure, and number of parties, we now have a clear
view of how the hybrid constitutional monarchy of Spain functions.
In conclusion based on the findings,
Spain does not adhere to Duverger’s law, there is a system of proportional
representation however there are only approximately 2.7 effective parties (there
are upwards of eleven different parties holding seats in the current senate).
[1] “Spanish transition to
democracy” Wikipeida. Oct. 25, 2012.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_transition_to_democracy
[2] Political Science 150
“Comparative Government” Syllabus. Professor Kirk Hawkins.
[3] DUVERGER, M. (1984),
“Which is the best electoral system?” in Lijphart, A. Grofman, B.(eds.),
Choosing an Electoral System: issues and alternatives, Praeger, New York.
ns_in_Spain
[5] “D’Hondt Method.” Electoral
Reform. 1 Nov 2012 <electoralreform.wikia.com>
[6] Ruel, Teresa.
“Electoral Systems in Southern European countries- Portugal, Spain, Italy and
Greece- an introductory approach to the quality of democracy” Instituto de Ciências Sociais – Universidade
de Lisboa. August 2010. Pg. 10
http://www.ecprnet.eu/databases/conferences/papers/881.pdf
This is interesting. It appears that proportional representation is often warped so much that the smaller parties are not represented at all.
ReplyDeleteIt is interesting to see how much difference there can be within the same sorts of systems to the point that the law seems to even be broken.
ReplyDeleteNice blog! You explained Spain's electoral rules very well. Like John and Lyndsey said before me, it is interesting to see how proportional representation sometimes causes the opposite effect of what it is intended to do.
ReplyDeleteGreat blog! I feel like you explained it clearly. It is cool to see examples of how the law does not always work. You proved it well through facts and explanations
ReplyDeleteyeah the smaller parties with proportional representation recieve the ability to be represented better.
ReplyDelete