Russia and Duverger’s Law

Bradyn Ray

Comparative Government and Politics

PL SC 150, Sec. 002

November 2, 2012

Blog 7: Russia and Duverger’s Law

            Duverger proposed the idea that the effective number of parties in any given country is a result of the electoral rules in that country. “Two broad types of electoral systems are used in almost all democracies: single-member-district-plurality systems (SMDP) and proportional representation systems (PR)” (Shively, 231). These differing systems have historically tended to have different effects on democracies: SMDP tends to force out smaller parties and usually results in two large parties, while PR tends to favor a larger number of smaller parties (Shively, 236). In Russia, this assumption is mostly accurate.

            Russia’s electoral system in its lower house of parliament, The State Duma, is one of complete proportional representation. This means “a political parties’ representation in [parliament] is set roughly proportional to their strength in the electorate” (Shively, 231). However, instead of dividing the country into several smaller districts or constituencies as many other proportional representative democracies do, the whole of Russia is one counted as one large constituency with a total of 450 seats (IPU, Electoral System). It applies the Hare method (the simple quotient and greatest remainders) in the distribution of seats (IPU, Electoral System).

            In the allocation of representative seats, the State Duma uses a closed, preferential, party-list (IPU, Electoral System). This means that voters do not have a direct say in who is elected, but only which party has the most seats. The parties themselves then choose the candidates to fill those seats.

            The voting thresholds in Russia are also worthy of notice. In order to be fully represented in the State Duma, a party has to gain at least 7 percent of the vote (IPU, Electoral System). But parties that do not receive at least 7 percent of the votes in an election do not necessarily lose representation:

“Exceptionally, parties that receive between 5 and 6 per cent of the votes are entitled to one seat and those that receive between 6 and 7 per cent are entitled to two seats. However, the candidates elected under these exceptional measures are not allowed to join any parliamentary faction” (IPU, Electoral System).

So within a well-defined threshold for parties (with some exceptions), one large constituency, and a party-list selection process, the electoral system of Russia’s State Duma is one of clearly defined proportional representation.

            According to Duverger’s theory, there should be several effective political parties in such a system. Using the results from the December 2011 elections (IPU, Last Elections) and according to Duverger’s very own formula, the Russian State Duma has approximately 2.9 effective political parties. While 2.9 is not so far removed from the supposed 2 effective-party system that is favored by a single-member-district-plurality system, 2.9 is larger than 2, which means Duverger may still have a point in assuming that a system of proportional representation can lead to a greater number of effective parties.

            In summary, when evaluating the Russian State Duma and its electoral system, it becomes apparent that it utilizes a party-list proportional representation system. Based on the December 2011 elections, and processing the information through Duverger’s formula, the State Duma has 2.9 effective parties, and while this may not be a huge distinction from the 2 party system encouraged by a single-member-district-plurality system, it nonetheless indicates that a proportional representation system most likely contributes to a strong, multi-party system.

Works Cited

"RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Gossoudarstvennaya Duma), Electoral System." IPU PARLINE Database. Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d. Web. 02 Nov. 2012. <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2263_B.htm>.

"RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Gossoudarstvennaya Duma), Last Elections." IPU PARLINE Database. Inter-Parliamentary Union, n.d. Web. 02 Nov. 2012. <http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2263_E.htm>.

Shively, W. Phillips. Part IV: The Apparatus of Government. Power & Choice: An Introduction to Political Science. 13th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2012. 230-36. Print.